The Nature of Consciousness /
Mark Rowlands
The Nature of Consciousness / - 1st ed. - Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2001. - ix, 245 p. ; 23 cm.
In The Nature of Consciousness, Mark Rowlands develops an innovative account of the nature of phenomenal consciousness, one that has significant consequences for attempts to find a place for it in the natural order. The most significant feature of consciousness is its dual nature: consciousness can be both the directing of awareness and that upon which awareness is directed. Rowlands offers a clear and philosophically insightful discussion of the main positions in this fast-moving debate, and argues that the phenomenal aspects of conscious experience are aspects that exist only in the directing of experience towards non-phenomenal objects, a theory that undermines reductive attempts to explain consciousness in terms of what is not conscious. His book will be of interest to a wide range of readers in the philosophy of mind and language, psychology and cognitive science.
1. The problem of phenomenal consciousness
2. Consciousness and supervenience
3. The explanatory gap
4. Consciousness and higher-order experience
5. Consciousness and higher-order thoughts
6. The structure of consciousness
7. What it is like
8. Against objectualism II: mistakes about the way things seem
9. Consciousness and representation
10. Consciousness and the natural order
Bibliography
Index.
9780521808583
Consciousness.
126 M3405 C / 102742
The Nature of Consciousness / - 1st ed. - Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2001. - ix, 245 p. ; 23 cm.
In The Nature of Consciousness, Mark Rowlands develops an innovative account of the nature of phenomenal consciousness, one that has significant consequences for attempts to find a place for it in the natural order. The most significant feature of consciousness is its dual nature: consciousness can be both the directing of awareness and that upon which awareness is directed. Rowlands offers a clear and philosophically insightful discussion of the main positions in this fast-moving debate, and argues that the phenomenal aspects of conscious experience are aspects that exist only in the directing of experience towards non-phenomenal objects, a theory that undermines reductive attempts to explain consciousness in terms of what is not conscious. His book will be of interest to a wide range of readers in the philosophy of mind and language, psychology and cognitive science.
1. The problem of phenomenal consciousness
2. Consciousness and supervenience
3. The explanatory gap
4. Consciousness and higher-order experience
5. Consciousness and higher-order thoughts
6. The structure of consciousness
7. What it is like
8. Against objectualism II: mistakes about the way things seem
9. Consciousness and representation
10. Consciousness and the natural order
Bibliography
Index.
9780521808583
Consciousness.
126 M3405 C / 102742